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Knowingly
Benefitting:
Blocking Relief for
DRC Child Cobalt
Miners
by Austin Clements*

John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., a recently decided1 class
action lawsuit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, sought to hold multinational corporations
liable for labor abuses that exist within the cobalt
supply chain in consumer electronics products.2
Extractive industries in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) are a prevalent site of human rights
abuses and exploitation and, in many ways, are a
relic of the DRC’s colonial past.3 Artisanal mining in
the country has led to increasingly dangerous
working conditions for miners and a rise in the use
of child labor to mine cobalt for electronics, such as
cell phones, electric cars, and laptops.4 Artisanal
* Austin Clements is a J.D. Candidate at American University
Washington College of Law. He is a Deputy Editor for the Human
Rights Brief and a Junior Staff Writer for the Journal of Gender,
Social Policy, and the Law.
1
While this article was being written, this case was dismissed in
the D.C. District. See John Doe I et al. v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv03737 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021). A timely appeal has been filed with
the D.C. Circuit Court.
2
Amended Complaint at 1-2, Jane Doe I v. Apple Inc., No. 1:1903737 (D.D.C. June 6, 2020) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
3
Accord Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From
Leopold to Kabila (2002); Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in
the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and
the Great War of Africa (2011); Adam Hochschild, King
Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism
in Colonial Africa (1998) (accounting historical exploitation
of the mineral, human, and other natural resources by colonial
powers that transitioned from foreign colonial state control to
foreign private corporate ownership.)
4
Is My Phone Powered by Child Labour?, Amnesty Int’l,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/06/drc-cobalt-child-labour/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
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mining is informal mining that is carried out using
primitive tools in largely unsupervised zones without
safety equipment.5 Often in these zones, tunnel
collapses and child labor are rampant.6 However, the
plaintiffs fell short of proving the burden required
under U.S. law to show that they could recover
damages from the defendants, which begs the
question of whether plaintiffs can recover at all from
U.S. based corporations for supply chain abuses
committed abroad.
In John Doe I, the plaintiffs filed a claim against five
tech giants—Alphabet, Apple, Dell, Microsoft, and
Tesla—for violations under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).7 The
plaintiffs alleged that the companies knowingly
benefitted from participation in a venture, which
engaged in child labor, thus violating the plaintiffs’
rights.8 For a claim under the TVPRA to prevail, the
plaintiffs must prove: (a) the companies knew or
should have known child labor was being used; (b)
with this knowledge defendants continued to
participate in a venture; (c) the defendants knowingly
benefitted from the participation in the venture; and
(d) the child plaintiffs were subjected to child labor.9
The corporate defendants acquired cobalt from
Glencore and Umicore and Huayou Cobalt, which
operate mines and artisanal mining zones (AMZs) in
the DRC.10 The plaintiffs allege that in the AMZs
they were injured as children, which squares the
fundamental legal question of whether a U.S.-based
corporation be held liable for human rights abuses
that occur in its opaque supply chain right in the
middle of the plaintiffs’ claim.

John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03737, *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 2,
2021).
6
Id.
7
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
8
Amended Complaint at 4.
9
John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03737, at *20.
10
Our evolving approach to ASM: a plan for co-existence and
transformation, Glencore (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.glencore.com/media-and-insights/insights/our-evolving-approachto-artisanal-small-scale-mining.
5
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Corporate responsibility in domestic human rights
law is widely debated and is a recurring barrier for
plaintiffs seeking redress.11 The issue is further
complicated when supply chains are as diffuse and
complex as the global cobalt supply chain,12 and
when local governments fail to exercise proper
oversight.13 In the United States, there are three
major pieces of legislation that plaintiffs have
attempted to use to gain relief: the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS),14 the Trafficking Victims Protection Act

See generally Stéphanie Bijlmakers, Corporate Social
Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law (2018) (arguing
generally for the responsibility of the multinational corporation to the communities that are exploited by the corporation);
Shuangge Wen & Jingchen Zhao, The Bumpy Road of Home
States’ Regulation of Globalized Business—Legal and Institutional Disruptions to Supply Chain Disclosure under the Modern Slavery Act, 69 Cath. U. L. Rev. 125, 127, 129–30 (2020)
(examining the impact of British soft law and common law on
corporate responsibility and arguing that states remain the primary enforcers of human rights law because of the complexity
of supply chains).
12
See Galit A. Sarfarty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains,
56 Harv. Int’l L.J. 419, 423, 431–432 (2015) (analyzing the
impact of domestic legislation and accountability for multinational mineral supply chains). Cobalt supply chains are almost
entirely operated by a third-party in the mining, refining, and
manufacturing processes. This exchange of ownership throughout the supply chain makes the cobalt nearly impossible to
track. See Susan van den Brink, René Kleijn, Benjamin Sprecher, & Arnold Tukker, Identifying Supply Risks by Mapping the
Cobalt Supply Chain, 156 Res., Conservation & Recycling 2
(May 2020) (mapping the physical diversity and diffusion of the
cobalt supply chain).
13
The DRC is attempting to control the artisanal cobalt industry by creating a state-based monopoly on purchase of the
cobalt, although this has still yet to materialize. See Hereward
Holland & Stanys Bujakera, Congo creates state monopoly for
artisanal cobalt, Reuters (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.reuters.
com/article/congo-mining/congo-creates-state-monopoly-for-artisanal-cobalt-idUSL4N2A020N.
14
The Alien Tort Statute was the first U.S. law to grant universal
jurisdiction, since expanding to allow violations under the “law
of nations” to be pursued in U.S. courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
11
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(TVPA),15 and the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).16
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which includes the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),17 allows for
jurisdiction over a non-citizen tortfeasor if the tort
was “committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”18 The original John Doe I
Complaint included an ATS claim; however, the
plaintiffs dropped the ATS claim in their Amended
Complaint. The TVPA explicitly calls for an
“individual” to perpetuate the act.19 In cases where
there is no way to know who the identity of the exact
actor imposing the forced or coerced labor, U.S.
courts have been very wary of imposing liability. For
example, most recently, the Supreme Court decided
Nestlé USA, Inv. v. Doe I, in which it held that if the
alleged tort was not committed in the United States
and the only domestic activity alleged was general
corporate activity, relief could not be pursued under
the ATS.20 This effectively bars the pursuit of
trafficking or labor abuse claims under the ATS in
most cases, and thus, survivors must seek relief
through other means. In the case of DRC cobalt
mining, the pursuit of relief under the ATS is further
complicated because the TVPA requires proof of
torture or an extrajudicial killing.21 However, the
definitions of torture under the act require a level of

The TVPA uses a three-pronged approach: protection for
foreign nationals, creation of new crimes and definitions, and
increased prevention to ensure that foreign countries are not
sites of trafficking as well. Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, 2000 Enacted H.R. 3244, 106 Enacted
H.R. 3244, 114 Stat. 1464, 106 P.L. 386, 2000 Enacted H.R.
3244, 106 Enacted H.R. 3244
16
While there has been several TVPRAs, the most important
for the current discussion is the 2008 reauthorization, which
added the language of “knowingly benefits”. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, 110 P.L. 457, 122 Stat. 5044 § 221 (2)(A)(ii).
17
The language of the Torture Victim Protection Act was added
as a provision on the Alien Tort Statute in 1991.
18
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
19
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 1992, H.R. 2092,
102nd Cong., § 2(a).
20
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2021).
21
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
15
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specificity that the AMZ child labor practices do not
meet.22 The ATS, while an avenue for some victims of
child labor to hold American individuals
accountable, has been held to be insufficient to hold
corporate defendants liable.23 And to further
complicate jurisdictional matters, the Court in John
Doe I believed that the TVPRA did not apply
extraterritorially.24
John Doe I may have abandoned its ATS claim early
into the proceedings, but the TVPA and TVPRA
theoretically remained viable avenues for potential
relief.25 Under this statutory approach, it is well
established that plaintiffs may sue an individual or a
corporation,26 which removes one of the barriers to
liability that is imposed in the ATS. The TVPRA’s
main evidentiary barrier is proving whether the
defendant knowingly benefits from the child labor,
which is exceedingly difficult to prove in the cobalt
supply chain.27
The cobalt supply chain is, both by nature and
through intentional obfuscation, a very difficult
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environment to prove that a defendant “knowingly
benefits” from child labor. The cobalt supply chain,
by its inherent nature, is complex and hard to track,
with many different entities controlling various parts
of the extraction and manufacturing of cobalt
biproducts.28 To complicate matters further, the
supply chains for conflict minerals and cobalt were
intentionally made more confusing following the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.29 This was to
circumvent new requirements for reporting30 on the
sourcing of 3T minerals and cobalt.31 In practice, the
lack of an adequate reporting mechanism makes
enforcement of the first provision of the TVPRA
untenable. Without an adequate reporting system,
large corporations can continue to claim that they
have no knowledge of the child labor within their
supply chains, even when it is a very real possibility.
Some NGOs have attempted to encourage reporting
in cobalt supply chains, although these reporting
attempts have not achieved widespread success
because of corporate reluctance.32 It is for the very
reason of the distance and obfuscation of the cobalt
Raw cobalt is often mixed from different sites to purify the ore
into pure metal that can be refined During a 2014 Government
Accountability Office inquiry, sixty-seven percent of companies
could not determine if their minerals came from the DRC or
not. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-15–561, SEC
Conflict Minerals Rule: Initial Disclosures Indicate
Most Companies Were Unable to Determine the Source
of Their Conflict Minerals 2 (2015).
29
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. Law No. 111-203, Part 3 of 3, 124 Stat. 1376, 111 P.L.
203, § 1502, 2010 Enacted H.R. 4173, 111 Enacted H.R. 4173.
The Dodd-Frank Act is the only legislation to mandate reporting of source information for conflict minerals.
30
This reporting mechanism is no longer enforced by the SEC.
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Updated Statement on the Effect
of the Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
corpfin-updated-statement-court-decision-conflict-minerals-rule; See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 520 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (holding mandated disclosure was compelled speech
under the First Amendment).
31
See Lisa Reisman, Loophole in Conflict Minerals Law Creates
Opportunity for Scrap Dealers, MetalMiner (Feb. 24, 2011),
https://agmetalminer.com/2011/02/24/loophole-in-conflict-minerals-law-creates-opportunity-for-scrap-dealers/.
32
Cobalt, Responsible Mins. Initiative, http://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/minerals-due-diligence/cobalt/ (last
visited Dec. 1, 2021).
28

Artisanal Mining Zones, by their design, are freelance and
require assumption of risk by the miners themselves. The tunnels and mining techniques used are not standardized or safe,
and cave-ins are common. Additionally, although child labor is
supposed to be discouraged, in practice it is regularly allowed
and observed through pseudo-willful blindness.
23
See generally Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
24
See John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03737, *26-30
(D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021).
25
While the TVPA and TVPRA added distinct provisions, they
are treated as the same avenue of relief in this article.
26
See Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2020) (interpreting the language of the TVPA to include
corporations and holding the congressional intent to not be so
narrow to exclude corporations); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492
F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (Claiming in dicta it is
common to assert a claim against a corporation under the ATS).
27
Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving
anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any
of the means described in subsection (a), knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of such means, shall
be punished. . .” (emphasis added). While the TVPRA requires
two other conditions to be met —participation in a venture and
knowledge of child labor— only the first is discussed here.
22
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supply chain that the District Court held that the
plaintiffs’ injuries in John Doe I were too distant and
could not be linked to the defendants.33
The plaintiffs in John Doe I relied upon the
transactions between the defendants and Huayou
and Glencore, alleging that widespread knowledge
that these two companies are notorious bad actors is
sufficient to show that the defendants “knowingly
benefitted.”34 The plaintiffs alleged that these
companies are known to be serial abusers of human
rights law, specifically regarding child labor practices,
and thus they should be known as “notorious bad
actors.” Merely receiving ore supply from these
companies, the plaintiffs argued, should be enough
to show that the defendants “knowingly benefitted”
from child labor practices.35 However, there is no
precedent to assert that proving someone is a bad
actor is sufficient to show that the company knew
they were benefitting from child labor. The plaintiffs
alleged that Apple knew, or should have known,
because they suspended purchases from Huayou in
2014 over concerns of child labor in their supply
chain, but they later resumed purchases in 2018
without evidence that Huayou made any real changes
in practice.36 However, this was not sufficient to
prove that Apple knew or should have known they
were engaged with a company who continued to
engage in child labor, as Huayou has since stopped
buying cobalt from AMZs in the DRC following the
filing of the lawsuit.37 The District Court pointed out
that merely engaging business partnership to gather
and supply cobalt is not a venture itself to induce or
provide child or forced labor.38 It is unclear if the
reputations of these “notorious bad actors” may be
sufficient evidence to show that the defendants
“knowingly benefitted” from child labor. Indeed, the
John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03737, *15–16 (D.D.C.
Nov. 2, 2021).
34
See Amended Complaint, at 75.
35
Id. at 65.
36
See id. at 79.
37
Harry Sanderson, China’s top cobalt producer halts buying
from Congo miners, Fin. Times (May 28, 2020), https://www.
ft.com/content/ce9af944-fb70-4576-88d0-dc76821facfd.
38
See John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03737, *12 (D.D.C.
Nov. 2, 2021).
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District Court saw it as an almost nonexistent claim,
treating it only in passing on its way to determining
that it was impossible for the defendants to have
“knowingly benefitted.”39 The court saw the plaintiffs’
injuries as too distant to be possibly be traced to the
defendants under § 1589.40
While there are multiple avenues by which plaintiffs
could seek damages for child labor in cobalt supply
chains using U.S. law, the oversight necessary to
make these valid claims is not present in
international supply chains. John Doe I’s complete
rebuttal of TVPRA claims on the grounds that
corporate defendants could not knowingly benefit
from these practices lays bare the inadequacy of U.S.
law to cover corporate liability. The U.S. government
has taken no steps to ameliorate this issue through
legislation, which makes its ratification of the Worst
Forms of Child Labor Convention seem hollow.41
Attempts to make mineral supply chains more
transparent (which is the only way to know if child
labor exists in a supply chain) were ruled
unconstitutional in the past.42 The TVPA and the
TVPRA seem to be clear avenues of relief for foreign
nationals who have faced child or forced labor in a
U.S. corporation’s supply chain. However, the both
natural and intentional lack of reporting in supply
chains, like the cobalt supply chain, make the
evidentiary burden required almost impossible to
prove. For U.S. law to provide for a reliable avenue of
relief for abuses that occur in supply chains,
Congress must further amend the language of the
TVPRA to also cover willfully blind corporations
that did not take adequate measures to ensure their
supply chains were free of child labor.

33

Id. at *24.
Id. at *22.
41
International Labour Organization [ILO], Worst Forms
of Child Labour Convention, No. 182 (June 17, 1999).
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182.
42
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 520–521 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
39
40
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Regional bodies are some of the primary creators of international law and are on the front lines of
human rights protections. The Regional Systems Team seeks to provide up-to-date coverage of the world’s
regional bodies. For the first time, the Regional Systems team is expanding beyond coverage of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to cover both the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
The Regional Systems team seeks to not only cover these issues but also analyze them within the context of
their respective regions.
The following articles examine some recent decisions from the ECtHR and ACHPR. The first
article follows the case of Vedat Şorli, a Turkish national who was convicted for his posts on Facebook
under a Turkish law that criminalizes insults against the President. Şorli has since sought a judgment from
the ECtHR on the compatibility of this law with the European Convention on Human Rights. The second
article examines the ECtHR’s new standard for evaluating mass surveillance regimes as outlined in two
recent decisions, Big Brother Watch v. UK and Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden. The final article discusses
an advisory opinion from the ACHPR on criminal vagrancy laws and analyzes the potential impact of the
ACHPR’s recommendations. Each of these articles highlights the critical role of regional courts in shaping the
human rights landscape of the future and putting an end to the abuses of the past.

* * *

